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Persistent Innovation Barriers, and How to Breach Them with 
Projects 
 
All organisations have uncompleted ‘innovation opportunities’ that have lingered 
conspicuously for years without resolution. At some stage however this persistent 
barrier to innovation may become a greater threat to progress because of changes in 
the internal or external environment. Which organisational practices are effective in 
triggering the innovation? This paper shows that successful patterns of practice 
depend on the nature of the innovation barrier to be breached. A study of 28 
innovation projects from widely different sectors suggests a framework of three 
innovation barrier types; contiguous, discontinuous and persistent. Breaking through 
these constraints depends on matching the barrier to the appropriate mix of routine or 
non routine practice. Standard search routines are generally sufficient for contiguous 
barriers, which are straightforward ‘next steps’. Discontinuous innovation barriers 
require a mix of non routine practices with standard routines that can help to introduce 
the new. The third type, persistent innovation barriers are the obstinate problems that 
have become accepted as ‘the facts of life’, and must be taken out of the 
organisational mainstream to be resolved. The paper is illustrated with successful 
innovation projects where the constraints on innovation were pushed back. It also 
shows how a mismatch between the barrier type and organisational response creates 
conflicts in priorities and can undermine innovation. Implications of the research for 
managers and researchers are outlined.   
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Introduction 
This paper is about breaking through the innovation barriers that have become the 
facts of life. These are the persistent problems and flaws that people have learned to 
“work around” or grudgingly accept: a product bug that will not go away, a functional 
restriction, or an inconvenient design characteristic; an unintended effect of having a 
more necessary feature. These types of problem present obstinate barriers to 
advancement and improvement. They may be irritating to the perfectionists but 
because they affect a localised, minor part of a product they are typically assigned to 
‘the back burner’ and lived with.  
 
Yet at some point these persistent innovation barriers may become a larger problem. 
Perhaps they prevent the firm from entering a more lucrative market, or else the 
existing customers’ standards become more exacting through increased competition. 
This paper analyses empirical research on persistent innovation barriers, and shows 
how the organisational response to them differs from other barriers, which we call 
discontinuous and contiguous. The research derives from a study of 28 innovation 
projects in a variety of organisations. It shows how managers and practitioners have 
addressed persistent innovation barriers successfully, as well as unsuccessfully. It 
offers a diagnostic framework on innovation barriers and suggests matching 
organisational practices to break through them.  
 
At core are the search activities that an organisation brings to bear in the face of an 
innovation barrier. This has been the subject of much debate and so the following 
section outlines ‘what we know about search, routines and innovation’. Various 
studies have tried to understand how the standard operations of a firm affect the 
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tendency to be creative and generate innovations with arguments for and against 
routinised behaviour. The following section briefly summarises the present study and 
how the research team and partner organisations worked together. We then describe 
the results in the shape of an Innovation Barriers framework, illustrating successful 
innovation projects and how they managed to break through the different types of 
barriers they faced. In the discussion we focus particularly on persistent innovation 
barriers and how they may be breached, considering a case where there was a 
mismatch between the barrier type and organisational approach. Finally we conclude 
with some key diagnostic questions that might help managers to identify innovation 
barriers and the appropriate practical response to them. 
 
What we know about search, routines and innovation    
Search and innovation 
Although the outcomes of an innovation process are by definition be uncertain, most 
practitioners and scholars generally agree that innovation is a process which must be 
managed in some way1. However the relationship between the stimuli for innovation 
and the managerial and organisational techniques to accomplish it is not 
straightforward. Since innovation involves the introduction of novelty, so questions 
are raised about the role of routine practice in organisations when attempting to 
innovate. Here we are particularly interested in the process of search, which is 
organisational activity aimed at solving a particular problem. By routines we refer to 
repetitive activities regularly occurring in an organisation in order for work to be done 
(see Exhibit 1 for definitions of concepts).  
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 1 AROUND HERE 
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 Thinking on the influence of standard search routines falls roughly into two camps; 
the first acknowledges their repetitive character but nevertheless sees routines as 
necessary for innovation and renewal, while the second emphasises the locally-
focused and conservative tendencies of routines. This debate on the influence of 
routines on the generation of innovation becomes clearer when considering the 
circumstances that lead to successful search; the conditions that ‘trigger’ innovation. 
Typically organisations will continuously engage in passive search, scanning the 
environment for information and signals much like a radar system. Passive search will 
generally be directed to established locale. But when there is a lack of confidence that 
important information is being picked up, the organisation is propelled into active 
search and probing. An example of a strong stimulus is the threat perceived because 
of a successful innovation of a competitor2.  
 
Active search is often initiated by a particular difficulty and is “problemistic” in its 
direction3. A problem is perceived when the organisation fails to achieve its 
objectives or anticipates deterioration in its position. When these kinds of perceptions 
are formed, search processes are mobilised and directed towards resolving the 
problem. This type of active, problemistic search in organisations is normally quite 
specific in its direction. In many respects it has a lot in common with the behaviour 
and impulses of engineering.  
 
Studies of technical innovation have shown that blockages, barriers and constraints 
are important ‘focusing devices’ for the advance of technology. Nathan Rosenberg4 
provides many such examples- an imbalance in the workings of the components in a 
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system will focus attention on its underperforming parts5; a cut-off source of supply 
of a key input or material will turn attention to producing a substitute. The advance of 
technical change is essentially about the detection of constraints followed by directed 
isolation of causes and effects; bumping-up against barriers recursively until they are 
understood and resolved. Many argue that this problemistic search process has been 
satisfactorily incorporated into the everyday routines of modern business. 
 
In favour of routines 
In the modern corporation the process of search has become a highly proceduralised 
activity. This is not restricted to the prototyping and testing of formal Research and 
Development, but includes the important function of scanning the environment for 
signals about new opportunities or the behaviour of competitors6. Other such search 
routines include business monitoring activities, networking, the preparation of 
feasibility studies, white papers, internal project proposals, validation by committee or 
the procurement of consultancy services. 
 
In spite of their repetitive and stable nature, corporate routines of search in established 
and perhaps bureaucratic organisations are nevertheless intended to stimulate new 
directions and solutions to apparent problems7. Search routines have been seen to 
effect dramatic change and breakthroughs, especially when they involve engagement 
with the external environment8. Crossing organisational barriers through practices 
such as R&D collaboration agreements, guest engineers and mobility networks can 
have a major impact on subsequent technology development9. Even internal routines 
that involve exposure to new unfamiliar knowledge such as cross-functional 
teamworking can promote innovative outcomes10.  
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 As regards the introduction of new practices, Nelson and Winter argue that 
established routines may be important components of innovative processes. Stable 
procedures can support the development of innovations if they are reliable and do not 
complicate the process through incompatibility with the new. In this view, routines 
aimed at innovation are not opposed to novelty, and can help to generate it, even if 
they are predictable and mundane in themselves11. 
 
Against routines 
The contrary position to this sanguine view on routines stresses how formal corporate 
search processes tend to be locally focused12. For technological innovations firms are 
disinclined to direct attention at distant and unfamiliar fields, but tend to follow 
trajectories that are stable and path-dependent13. This is partly because of the 
significant and costly learning that is required to enter a new technical area, but also 
because search processes are directed by powerful cognitive frames in people’s heads 
that can lead to inertia not only in technical terms but also in the strategy and business 
model, product development and marketing functions14.  
 
Search activity may be instigated by circumstances that are exceptional, however the 
practices in response are quite regular and ‘everyday’ to the organisation, so the 
argument goes. In terms of process, product development teams with well-established 
procedures are the least likely to deviate from their pre-existing patterns of 
behaviour15. Tightly-routinised structures do not typically generate pioneering 
innovations as their outputs. Instead the results of search may be imitation of 
competitors’ offerings, or else the re-hashing of the firm’s current recipes16. Routines 
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that were once the organisation’s core capabilities instead become core rigidities17, 
indicating a failure to innovate. 
 
Successful routines are perpetuated in the organisational life, while the less successful 
are dropped, but this logic means that potentially useful domains for search are 
discarded. For search routines to be directed towards the ‘tried and tested’ solutions 
and their vicinity means potentially important information will be missed, rather like 
the drunk who drops his keys, and looks for them only on the ground under the lamp-
post. There is a parallel here between the individual and the organisational level in the 
power of cognitive schema and the routinisation of search; over time practitioners 
may become more narrowly focused, their skills become rusty and so innovation 
involves minor improvements to existing products and processes. The critics of 
routine argue the same is true for organisations.  
 
New routines and practices are therefore argued by many to be keener blades for the 
generation of innovation. There are a great many innovation scholars that advocate 
the use of the non-routine in order to promote radical or discontinuous innovation18. 
In many cases this is in the form of separate venture teams or “skunk works” where 
isolated units are freed from the operational constraints of the organisation’s 
mainstream. Tushman and O’Reilly’s idea of ambidextrous organisations refers to 
managing different innovation streams and operating in multiple modes so as to 
support the opposing goals of stability and experimentation. In particular they give 
examples from Nonaka’s research into Japanese organisations’ mission task forces 
and autonomous venture teams as examples of how to promote breakthrough or 
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discontinuous innovations. These cases showed removal to isolated settings and 
freedom from the restraints of the mainstream organisation. 
 
Within such settings improvised practices may emerge. With improvisation the design 
and execution of a task occur at the same time19, rather than a routine practice which 
is first planned, and later executed. A celebrated example is the playing of jazz music, 
where improvisation ranges from some impromptu variation around a melody (such 
as Louis Armstrong) to unstructured ‘free form’ jazz (such as John Coltrane in the late 
1960s). Improvised practice in work settings have been observed and studied and 
recommended as promoting creativity and lateral thinking- a useful alternative to 
routines. 
 
Given this review of prior research and managerial experience we have conflicting 
messages over how innovation barriers may be successfully tackled. On the one hand 
problemistic search routines are argued to generate innovation themselves or else 
support the introduction of new ones. On the other hand standard routines are argued 
to be sources of conservatism. This suggests the following key puzzles:  
 
• Under which circumstances (or barriers) do standard organisational routines 
generate search leading to innovation? 
• Under which circumstances (or barriers) are standard routines insufficient to 
generate search leading to innovation? 
• How can management diagnose the nature of an innovation barrier? 
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In this paper we aim to shed light on these questions concerning how and when 
‘bumping-up’ against technical and organisational barriers propels innovators into 
search and the subsequent phases and routines towards an innovative solution. We 
show that the choice of search routines to employ depends on the nature of the 
innovation barrier that is being negotiated, and that this matters a great deal to a 
successful outcome. This is derived from a two-year study of innovation projects 
described in the next section. 
 
The cross-sectoral innovation projects study 
The research team conducted a two year study with 7 organisations aimed at 
transferring effective innovation practice across differing industrial sectors. The 
organisations were drawn from the diverse backgrounds of aerospace, food 
packaging, public sector health services, road construction and maintenance, software 
and simulations, telecommunications services and equipment, and whisky distilling 
and distribution,. The sample were not selected to be representative of a particular 
industry or type of firm, but were invited to join the project because of their 
distinctiveness from each other.  
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The stages of the research process are presented in Exhibit 2. The method was both 
deductive, influenced by the concepts from the innovation literature already outlined 
and inductive since the organisations participating in the research contributed at key 
stages of the process. Details of the method followed are explained in Appendix A. 
The steps of the research process enabled the building of a theoretical framework 
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based on the innovation barriers faced by the studied firms, and the routine or non-
routine nature of the practices employed to break through them. Some examples of the 
innovations studied are given in Exhibit 3. 
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 3 AROUND HERE 
 
An innovation barriers framework 
We found three types of innovation barrier when we analysed the 28 innovation 
projects in the study, these are the barriers to progress, the constraints and the 
problems that trigger search to innovation. We called these three types contiguous, 
discontinuous and persistent barriers.  Our interest was the manner of organisational 
routine or practice deployed to sustain a successful search process through to 
implementation of an innovation. The results are represented by the diagram, Exhibit 
4. The barriers are represented by the three edges of a triangle, which is imposed on a 
circle. One half of the circle represents the standard organisational routine, the other 
half the non-routine. 
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 4 AROUND HERE 
 
The first two barrier types, contiguous and discontinuous are quite well trodden over 
in the literature but we know very little on what we call persistent innovation barriers. 
These are the forgotten and unglamorous problems that people and organisations learn 
to live with. We have nevertheless found cases where this type of barrier was 
permeated and overcome through judicious organisational practice. We focus on the 
persistent barrier problem in the paper since it is relatively neglected; first, however 
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we describe the routines observed in the first two types, contiguous and 
discontinuous. The findings here to a large degree confirm conventional wisdom.  
 
Contiguous barriers 
Many of the innovation cases studied in our partner organisations were fairly 
predictable ‘next steps’ from previous work. These included so-called incremental 
innovations, that follow a trajectory established over some time: an improvement to 
the functionality of a product, extra features or greater performance. In terms of 
process innovations an example is the introduction of a new work breakdown 
structure to follow an established product architecture structure. The barriers for 
innovations such as these are proximate and adjacent to the last. 
 
For these cases the standard search routines of the organisation were effective and 
sufficient to mobilise resources and people to enact the stages of the innovation 
process. There was generally little deviation from what would be considered as 
mainstream and everyday operations, in order to solve problems of a contiguous 
nature. The problems themselves closely resembled those solved previously, and in 
many cases used the same techniques to differentiate a new ‘version’ of a product or 
to slightly improve performance in a measurable way. For this reason the contiguous 
barrier represented by one edge of the triangle in Exhibit 4 occupies the ‘routine’ half 
of the organisational circle of possibilities. 
   
Discontinuous Barriers 
The second type of innovation barrier was where an organisation was attempting to 
enter a substantially new area for that organisation. This represents a significant 
 12
deviation from the previous path or trajectory and is often referred to in the literature 
as ‘discontinuous innovation’. The organisation is typically propelled towards a 
discontinuous barrier through some crisis or recognition that major internal 
adjustment is required. This is often in response to a change in the external 
environment that affects the organisation’s value chain and relationships. We present 
two examples of innovation projects engaging discontinuous barriers in Exhibit 5.  
 
Innovation barriers of a discontinuous nature are daunting, requiring new structures 
and resources that are inadequately understood within the firm. They will certainly 
require non-routine practices and activities to enact the innovation. Yet in these cases 
we can observe the importance of established routines in supporting the introduction 
of the new. This is consistent with the Nelson and Winter argument that established 
routines may serve as ‘components’ of new activities and facilitate the innovation. 
Holding some behavioural variables constant in a transition is certainly of some value 
in the management of morale, and familiar structures may prove efficient at driving 
forward the wide range of tasks necessary for entry into a new technology or product 
market. For this reason the discontinuous barrier in Exhibit 4 transcends both routine 
and non-routine organisation practice.  
 
Exhibit 5 shows cases of discontinuous innovation barriers and the mix of routine and 
non-routine practices brought to bear on them. SimCo is a provider of customised 
simulators and training solutions to military and civilian markets and needed to 
respond to an important technological shift in its industry. Previously in the 1990s 
civil aviation companies ceased the practice of flying actual aeroplanes in the training 
of their pilots.  At that stage there was a considerable cost advantage in the use of 
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flight simulators when compared with real flight training. The next stage on from 
simulators was the development of microcomputer-based training (CBT), which was 
proving to be an effective and low-cost alternative to high-end customised simulators. 
 
The trend towards PC-based solutions has lowered barriers to entry in the simulation 
and training industry, meaning that SimCo faced competition from new entrants 
exploiting the relatively small investments needed for PC-based CBT. Increasingly, 
the lower cost solutions were proving attractive to major customers. Key individuals 
argued that the firm needed to change its view of the product it offered. Many people 
in the firm thought they were in the business of providing simulators- pieces of kit. 
While what was required was an understanding that the firm offered solutions to 
training needs. These solutions would draw from a range of technologies from large 
units of equipment in the form of conventional simulators to microcomputer based 
training at the ‘low end’.  
 
This entailed a major deviation in thinking as well as the news skills and capabilities 
required to deliver courseware suitable for CBT. In such a scenario persuasion and 
advocacy is needed. The internal champions used familiar and ‘everyday’ routines to 
raise awareness of the need to change among their colleagues, such as working 
papers, conferences and presentations. These ‘comfortable’ routines helped to 
disseminate the unsettling message of what was needed to break through the barrier. 
Non-routine practices mainly involved the building of a CBT team within the 
organisation, recruiting specialists in unfamiliar fields like educational psychology 
and courseware design, as well as external search routines like participating in 
standardisation committee work.  
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 Interestingly, a new Training Needs Analysis routine was introduced for all new 
SimCo contracts, which is an example of how regular routines may emerge from the 
novel and improvised practices. This is a typical example of the combination of 
routine and non-routine in an approach to a discontinuous barrier. A similar pattern 
can be observed in the second discontinuous barrier; ScreenCo’s entry into a radical 
new Liquid Crystal Display technology. We now turn to the third type of innovation 
barrier, which shows a rather different profile.  
 
Persistent Barriers 
There has been much written on practices to trigger discontinuous innovation and 
contiguous barriers are more or less the starting point for conventional product 
development, which is well-understood. However the third edge of the triangle of 
innovation barriers in Exhibit 4 is much more neglected. Persistent innovation 
barriers, almost by definition receive less attention, since these are the long-standing 
problems that people have learned not to see. They might have received some 
attention years ago, but required more work to really crack the problem than seemed 
justified. The problem then took on the qualities of a natural constraint; one of the 
facts of life. Search was ended as the organisation was more or less satisfied and more 
pressing priorities were addressed. 
 
At some stage however the persistent barrier to innovation may become a bigger 
threat to progress because of changes elsewhere in the internal or external 
environment. This represents a quandary for the organisation, since the routine 
practices have not been capable of resolving the snag. It is this type of scenario that 
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was perhaps most interesting of the innovation projects in the study. Exhibit 6 and 7 
show two cases where persistent barriers were tackled. The organisational routines 
that were successful were quite different to the solutions to those of a contiguous and 
discontinuous nature. 
 
Persistent innovation case 1: Absorbent polystyrene meat tray 
The innovating organisation, FoodPack20 always aims to be lead the industry with 
new products, yet the stream of new concepts does not always flow easily. This 
innovation project began with the recognition by senior managers that there were no 
new product ideas coming through. The roots of the problem stemmed from a prior 
experience when the company had been “kicked” by an instance of launching a new 
product prematurely. The product was not ready for distribution and consequently an 
important customer- a major supermarket chain - had no product to fill its shelves for 
a day. As a result of this corporate embarrassment the organisation had stopped 
innovation and had “moved back into a comfort zone”; inertia set in.   
 
To break out of this constraint of gun-shy conservatism, managers reached for an 
unexploited opportunity in the form of a patent purchased by FoodPack some years 
before. The patent contained the potential to develop a polystyrene tray for meat, 
which could absorb the product’s blood and juices. A pad-less tray would mean major 
cost reduction, extended shelf-life so granting extra time for distribution, as well as 
design advantages to appeal to the final consumer 
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Search to solution 
The FoodPack Operations Manager had been reading about ‘Skunk Works’21 style 
product development and suggested this model as a way of energising and avoiding 
the large firm bureaucracy that tended to slow down development. They identified a 
cross-functional team of individuals known to be capable of the “wild and wacky”.  
They were set a 1 year deadline before the product launch when it should be fully 
tried, tested and approved. The team were released from standard organisational 
constraints operationally and psychologically. They were collocated and encouraged 
to chat, scribble ideas on the wall, create, clarify and challenge their emerging ideas in 
a non-threatening environment. Yet this was described as a “controlled freedom” 
since a project manager provided structure and focus, together with bi-weekly 
executive briefings and reviews with the Board, including a demanding technical 
director. These arrangements were all quite non-routine for the firm. 
 
Following the initial “crazy idea” stage, the team were told to go away for a week and 
think about what resources they needed. The Operations Manager told them they 
could have anything they wanted, which forced him into a predicament: 
 
It was the worst thing I ever said, but in essence it was the best thing I ever 
said… They wanted me to give them a machine for a year. Under a normal 
concept you wouldn’t have actually ever done that. You wouldn’t have said 
yes, ‘you can have your way’. My first answer was ‘No you can’t have a 
machine, because I need to service the market. And I remember the meeting, 
the first answer they came back to me was ‘but you said we could have 
anything’, and I said ‘well, I didn’t expect you to ask for one of my 
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machines’…, I had to go and find a way around it in the end they did [get the 
machine]. 
 
Despite the reservations, the ‘skunk works’ approach paid off. The project succeeded 
on its terms, its additional cost was an estimated £200,000, which made it one of the 
cheapest projects that operations had ever conducted. But there were other benefits; 
the appetite for innovation had been aroused again with an idea for a next generation 
product. Another benefit was an organisational change; FoodPack’s centralised 
technical centre was closed, with the engineers moved into the sites where products 
were made in order to bring a commercial focus to research, and innovation to the 
manufacturing sites. This decision was partly based on the success of the meat tray 
project and its combination of technical experimentation and commercial focus. 
 
The project’s success in breaking through a persistent barrier was largely attributed to 
its non-routine nature and the relaxation of standard procedure and thought. On 
documentation requirements for example, the Project Leader insisted “the worst thing 
we could do would be to put things in tablets of stone.” This is an example of a 
removed organisational constraint that enabled the team to break through the 
formidable constraints of current technical knowledge and the inertia within the firm 
to generate a radical innovation.  
 
These non-routine practices were counterpoised to the standard routines of the 
mainstream. Exhibit 6 shows the standard routines followed in FoodPack as 
contrasted with those that emerged on the innovation project.  We argue that it was 
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though these emergent working practices that the trigger to innovate was effected. A 
similar pattern can be seen in the second case. 
 
Persistent innovation case 2: Distorted screen display reducer 
The ScreenCo case is an incremental improvement to an established product. 
Similarly to FoodPack, ScreenCo faced a technical constraint and an organisational 
constraint. This was another challenge of stretching the technical properties of the 
product. However there were also organisational constraints in the form of severely 
limited resources to develop innovations. ScreenCo had no resource or organisational 
slack, which is typical of small, project-based firms22. 
 
Working within the resource constraints a prototype model was put together “using 
MDF, chewing gum, sticky tape and string”.  Since there was no slack in the 
production schedule the team worked outside of normal hours. Nor did ScreenCo 
have the finances to manufacture a sphere for development purposes, so the team 
leader decided to “hijack” a customer’s system under assembly over a weekend. He 
sent an email to his engineers asking for volunteers to work over the weekend: “We’re 
going to pinch a customer’s mirror for a weekend, who’s in?” They quickly fitted the 
solution and got it to work, and then de-rigged it for Monday morning. This shows the 
slightly shadowy, after-hours nature of the project and the improvisation that 
occurred. The respective standard routines and ‘non-routines’ are shown in Exhibit 7. 
 
Similarly to FoodPack, loose documentation requirements were reported to be 
important in maintaining a momentum as well as morale, according to the program 
manager:   
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 The whole process took about 8 months and the first prototype was up and 
running in 1 month. [I]f we’d have laden it with excessive documentation up 
front, then I think the process would have slowed and stalled. And the other 
bonus is that the people working on it, if they see bits arriving, and they see 
their drawings going out the door, and they see their test data being generated, 
their involvement is much heavier and they’re much more excited and they’re 
much more interested in getting it finished and done. Whereas if they come 
into work thinking, ‘I’ve got to spec today, catalogue and report on what I’ve 
done for the last 3 weeks, generating a justification for the next stage’ interest 
dwindles. 
 
The ‘Distort Reducer’ innovation was successful and welcomed by the customer. It 
has been patented by ScreenCo and licensing is seen as a potential revenue stream. It 
is being retrofitted to other customers’ existing products for a fee and ScreenCo is 
looking to implement the Distort Reducer on the range of smaller products to 
maintain a competitive edge across the portfolio. A Mark 2 improvement is on the 
drawing board. The original distortion problem had been an irritating eyesore for 
years but had become a threat to competitiveness when the company was aiming to 
diversify into a new market. It was this urgency that propelled the firm to break this 
persistent innovation barrier. It needed some ingenuity and taking the problem out of 
the constrained standard operations to force the breakthrough. 
 
Mismatching practices with barriers 
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We have argued that taking a persistent barrier to innovation out of ‘normal’ 
organisational routines helps to make progress where the mainstream routines have 
failed. We show in Exhibit 8 what can happen if this is not done. This is a case where 
the innovation barrier had all the hallmarks of persistence, a reconfigurable core 
software architecture that had long made sense for a project-based firm like SimCo. 
When the firm took the decision to make resources available to develop the idea it 
was tied to a live standard project, in order to share funding and engineering 
resources. This led to conflicting priorities and the everyday routine gradually took 
precedence over the innovation work.  
 
The project went over budget as eventually engineers satisfied both masters; the 
contract and the innovation development. With hindsight the project manager 
responsible concluded that the core architecture should have been separated from 
routine work. With a choice between pressures of project deadlines and the cracking 
of persistent innovation barriers, most people will reach for the lower-hanging fruit of 
the live project. This is precisely why trickier innovation barriers become persistent, 
and why it often requires dedicated attention away from standard routines and 
mindsets to resolve them. 
 
As well as the conflicting priorities, another interesting difference with the two cases 
where non-routine practices were applied was that documentation was seen to be too 
loose. The project manager claimed “…that’s the major lesson that came out of this. 
Much more detail in specification and documentation. We left too much open. That 
was the approach I was looking for; without the design reviews, but it doesn’t work. 
Too many reviews, too tight, doesn’t work, too much freedom, doesn’t work. It’s 
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balance, finding the balance is the hard part”. We discuss this dilemma in the next 
section. 
 
Discussion 
Loosen constraints to break constraints? 
We have seen that in some cases non routine practices are a relaxation of standard 
procedure and have been successful. Do we then conclude that merely relaxing 
managerial controls will help break persistent barriers? This would be an elegant 
message: loosen some constraints to break through others. However the experience of 
the previous project illustrates how looseness can be excessive. While we 
counterpoise standard routines and the non routine, this is not a tight/loose dichotomy 
in the same way as the ambidextrous architectures concept.  Tushman and O’Reilly 
recommend loose practice for periods of technological ferment and tight control for 
stable stages of a life cycle. Our focus is the type of innovation barrier being faced in 
a search problem, rather than stages in the product life cycle per se, and we do not 
suggest loose routines for persistent barriers as a general rule for persistent barriers. 
 
Both of the two successful innovation cases showed that relaxation of organisation 
routine and procedure certainly appeared to facilitate the process. However there were 
also pressures and constraints that were applied to the teams beyond the original 
technical difficulties. For FoodPack these were the project deadline pressures and 
high level review meetings with the Board and Technical Director, while for 
ScreenCo the intensity of working around the resource constraints meant that in some 
respects management practice was tighter than the standard routines. 
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 Some constraints appear to be search enhancing such as focused timelines, the 
technical challenge, and the resource constraints that enforce improvisation and 
creativity. Other constraints block search and innovation, one example in these two 
cases was documentation. This was identified as being a block by the project 
managers because it slows progress and de-motivates. Non routines can be 
constraining but they do need to be dynamic and revitalising, not boring activities. 
The practices that developed in the two cases show a mix of technical and 
organisational constraints as well as ‘loose’ practices, like brainstorming for solutions 
and writing on the walls.  
 
Yet the ‘non routines’ do not just emerge within a vacuum of control. While the usual 
stringent documentation requirements were not observed in the FoodPack and 
ScreenCo cases there were other forms of recording the key work tasks. Some 
functions, like accounting for time, were relaxed but for important tasks rigorous 
documentation was crucial, such as recording the data produced when testing the 
prototype products. 
 
A large part of the effectiveness of the non routine is precisely because it is different 
from the everyday and the mundane. This promotes the lateral thinking and fresh 
perspectives that can crack a persistent problem. In some instances this might mean a 
loosening of process or in others a tightening that has the effect of focusing search 
and opening new ways of thinking that triggers the innovation. The FoodPack barrier 
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meat tray was a latent opportunity and the product of years of external passive search, 
but it was not until the nonroutine was tried that the active search to solution occurred. 
It required a fresh mix of practices to induce the change. 
 
Where does the non routine come from? 
Non routine practices may be used irregularly in the organisation or manager’s toolkit 
and kept in reserve for special occasions. Alternatives to the standard practice may be 
have been tried and abandoned in the past, or in other settings. They may also have 
been read about, like the FoodPack manager reading about Skunk Works, or heard 
about on the grapevine. The most extreme non routine is the case of improvised 
practice, for example the ScreenCo engineers pulling together plumbing pipe, MDF, 
string and whatever resources they could muster to build a prototype of the 
contraption they had envisaged in a brainstorming session.  
 
However even improvised practices are drawing on memory of actions and skills 
learned previously. Closer examination of jazz music reveals a fair amount of 
repetition, whereby musicians will fall back on favoured ‘licks’ and phrases 
committed to memory for the moments when inspiration fails. Similarly when 
improvising in work settings practitioners are not only experimenting with genuinely 
new ideas. Instead they might suggest and employ practices they had previously 
experienced, or had heard or read about vicariously.  
 
Moorman and Miner have argued that at an individual and collective level people 
draw on two types of memory during improvisation: procedural memory- the skills 
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and repertoire of “things we can do”, and declarative memory- ‘facts’ and theories. 
While declarative memory tends to encourage novelty and the ‘trying-out’ of new 
ideas, procedural memory works against unfamiliar actions, reverting to the tried and 
tested. 
 
The problem with declarative memory is that since it is more theoretical and not 
dependent on personal experience and know-how, there is such a vast range of 
possibilities that this presents a search problem: how to select tasks and actions 
judiciously. Procedural memory moderates the excesses of declarative memory by 
providing coherence and structure of practices that are known to work. The 
implication of this is that even within improvised practices there may be an element of 
established structure: new innovative practices do not fall from the sky. Yet the 
greater the influence of procedural memory: the lower the chance of novelty and 
innovation. 
 
The non routine also appeals to the darker side of personalities. Task forces and 
Skunk Works are often described as feeling exclusive and secretive. The FoodPack 
and ScreenCo teams worked for long hours on these projects, and their morale and 
motivation was linked with the covert, authorised rule breaking.  The secret may be 
precisely because the process is nonroutine that enables out-of-the-ordinary results. 
To break routine to innovate, you must also have routines to break with; this may 
have the feeling of a counter culture: ‘Punk Works’ rather than Skunk Works.   
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The role of management requires a stepping back to allow the non routine to develop. 
Peter Augsdörfer23 has shown the prevalence of ‘bootlegging’ innovations, where 
management turns a ‘blind eye’ to unauthorised innovation activity. But the role of 
management in the context of persistent barriers is not so much turning a blind eye, as 
giving a nudge and a wink.  
 
Innovating in the Last Chance Saloon 
That non routine practice can help to generate innovation has long been known by 
practitioners and innovation scholars. The practices employed by the firms in our 
study are not especially remarkable and will probably feature in the toolkit of most 
innovative firms. However what is new is our focus on the pattern of matching 
organisational practice with the type of innovation barrier, and in particular the thus 
far neglected case of persistent innovation barriers. We found non routine practices to 
be effective for persistent barriers, standard routines for contiguous barriers and a mix 
of both for discontinuous barriers.  
 
We identified these organisational responses to the three categories of innovation 
barrier when analysing our data. However our study of 28 innovation projects is of 
course a limited sample. In other circumstances it may be that a different pattern 
could be observed which also led to successful innovations. Our findings however are 
consistent with the innovation theory and provide a starting point for thinking about 
the reasons why routines are considered innovation friendly in some instances and 
innovation hostile in others.  
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One finding which may be counter intuitive is the mixture of the routine and non 
routine for discontinuous innovations. It could be argued that entirely non routine 
practices ought to be used for discontinuous barriers to break through these 
formidable constraints. This is often the logic behind setting up New Venture 
Divisions; separating a new innovative unit from an established parent and thereby 
protecting it from the forces of conservatism.  This is an entirely valid organisational 
strategy but there are hazards, particularly around how the innovative unit is 
integrated back into the mainstream organisation.  
 
Tushman and O’Reilly’s work on ambidexterity is concerned with how the innovation 
streams and their differing systems of operation are to be integrated in the 
organisation. They warn of the dangers of allowing newer units to be starved or 
trampled to death by established divisions. Gary Hamel’s Leading the Revolution24 
also insists on incorporating innovative thinking throughout the business. Without 
this, independent skunk works type ventures may become isolated and never integrate 
with the parent organisation and its resources, and so are often unrealised.  
 
The diffusion of innovation into the mainstream can be observed in the FoodPack 
case, where the success of the meat tray project in taking product development closer 
to the production line was instrumental in a relocation of the engineering function 
within the operating divisions.  In this way the engineers could have better access to 
working machinery and test out concepts and prototypes just as in the innovation 
project. What was seen as unthinkable at the start of the project became non routine 
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within a task force setting, and later became assimilated as standard routines in the 
mainstream organisation. 
 
This sequence of events is quite common. A well-known example is the IBM Personal 
Computer task force that was given autonomy and delivered the PC in less than one 
year. The PC task force later became a division (and many would argue lost its buzz 
because of it). In fact other important IBM products, the System 360 mainframe and 
the ThinkPad portable PC were initiated through the nonroutine, but were eventually 
assimilated.25
 
So in addition to an innovative solution to a particular problem, an unexpected 
outcome of employing non routine practices may be further effects on the 
organisation. The non routines could become assimilated into the mainstream, by 
forcing a review of the innovative potential of standard routines. But this is by no 
means an objective of the original decision, and we would envisage in most cases the 
‘non routines’ to be dropped and placed back in reserve. It is in the temporary 
application that they may be most potent. They should not be relied upon to 
rejuvenate an inert business, which is a longer term and wider ranging endeavour26. 
They might however suggest directions on the path to broader transformation.  
 
Non routine practices should be seen as ‘the last chance saloon’ for particularly 
thorny problems where the mainstream organisation has failed. It may be that some 
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useful practices emerging from an innovation project will be integrated into the 
standard routines, or simply added to the ‘special menu’ of non routines. Exhibit 9 
illustrates this with an algorithm diagram showing the high level flow of decisions to 
diagnose innovation barriers and match appropriate organisational practices with 
them. We discuss some diagnostic questions in the conclusions. 
 
Conclusions 
We considered the problem of when to employ routine practices and when to 
encourage non routine practices in order to promote innovation. We found that the 
effectiveness of the approach depended on the nature of the innovation barrier to be 
tackled. When the proposed innovation is an obvious progression from a familiar path 
we found standard routines were effective and sufficient. When the proposition was a 
major deviation from previous activity within the organisation we found a mixture of 
routines and non routine practices was effective to mobilise the energy and control 
needed. Finally we found a third type of innovation barrier, which we called 
persistent, where only a conscious removal from standard routine was effective in 
breaking through the constraint. This suggests that when attempting to innovate 
managers may be able to diagnose the nature of the barrier and to assess what 
organisational arrangements may be brought to bear on it. 
 
Contiguous innovation barriers 
For contiguous innovation barriers, the ‘decision’ is in effect a non-event since 
cracking this type of problem is essentially what standard routines are for and do all 
the time. Questions to diagnose a contiguous barrier may include the following: 
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• Is the proposed innovation a new ‘version’ of an existing product? 
• Does it involve the extension of the ‘range’ of existing offerings? 
• Does it add new features to a component or subsystem product? 
• Is the product being sold to a familiar customer base? 
• Is the suggested improvement a measurable but not radical performance 
increase? 
• Does the innovation draw on the organisation’s existing skills base? 
• If a process innovation, does the proposed change add to existing structures, 
rather than replacing them? 
 
Discontinuous innovation barriers 
Having thought through such questions as those above a manager may conclude that 
the innovation barrier is a logical ‘next step’ from prior innovations and that the 
standard routines will suffice. However if the organisation faces a change in path from 
the ‘bread and butter’ and wants to enter into a new area, this will require the 
introduction of the non routine, but standard routines may also be helpful to support 
the introduction of the new. In particular the persuasion aspect that is crucial to 
mobilising an assault on a discontinuous barrier may be done through familiar styles 
of communication. In a sense enlisting support is as important as building the new 
skills and structures and a radical message may be better received through less radical 
means. In addition the established routines might form ‘components’ of discontinuous 
practice provided that they are not incompatible with them. This has the effect of 
reducing risks in introducing the very new, and increases the possibility survival 
through integration with the mainstream organisation. Diagnostic questions might 
include the following: 
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 • Does the innovation require new and different skills from those already in the 
organisation? 
• Would the innovation be aimed at a new and different customer base? 
• Is the innovation a reaction to the organisation being challenged because of 
some change in its competitive environment? 
• Does the innovation involve a radical (great than 30%) performance increase? 
• Is there resistance to the ideas underlying the need to enter the new area? 
• Would the necessary resources and capabilities to deliver the innovation 
involve new relationships with external actors? 
 
Persistent innovation barriers 
Persistent innovation barriers may well have some characteristics of the two other 
types. Perhaps they were discontinuous opportunities that were left on the rack, since 
the firm’s existing wardrobe could last another few years. They have been considered 
contiguous barriers once, but after some digging away at the problem it was realised 
that this was not the next simple step, but something more challenging. The 
organisation learned to ‘work around it’ and the constraint was accepted as one of 
life’s imperfections. However a change in the environment may have brought the 
persistent problem back into the foreground. Like an abandoned and neglected house, 
it appears more conspicuous as its neighbouring buildings are refurbished. The 
troublesome component may become a bottleneck to overall progress.  Questions to 
diagnose a persistent innovation barrier might include these: 
 
• Is this a problem that has been tackled before and abandoned? 
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• Does solving this problem seem self-evident “in an ideal world”? 
• Do customers repeatedly complain about this problem? 
• In a time management matrix, would the problem be placed in the ‘not urgent’ 
quadrant? 
• In a time management matrix, would the problem have moved from ‘not 
important’ to ‘important’? 
 
If there is a broadly positive answer to these types of questions, this would appear to 
be a persistent innovation barrier. The organisation will have tried in the past to push 
through this constraint without success, and so it has become accepted as given. 
However our study has suggested that taking this type of problem outside the standard 
search routines aids the lateral thinking and fresh perspectives that might produce the 
breakthrough. This might entail a Skunk Works type task force, an informal ‘virtual’ 
team releasing people from their everyday jobs, or simply of series of extracurricular 
meetings that can generate a ‘buzz’ and thoughtful conversation. In each case 
management’s role is a careful balance of license as well as unobtrusive focus. There 
is a role for experimentation in this respect as well. 
 
There is scope for further research on the durable nature and weaknesses of persistent 
innovation barriers, which, almost by definition are a neglected phenomenon. It may 
also be that there the three barriers suggested by our data may be joined by others, 
that each have distinct organisational implications. We might expect refinements and 
further insights from looking at the routine/non-routine debate in terms of innovation 
barriers. This provides food for thought for researchers, as well as heartening 
evidence for innovating (and constrained) practitioners.  
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___________________________________________________________ 
Appendix A: The research method 
 
Working with practitioners in the organisations the researchers identified four types of 
innovation project in each organisation. These were product innovations of both 
radical and incremental nature and innovations in organisational process of both 
radical and incremental types. The research team then collected data on an example of 
each innovation type in each of the seven organisations. The primary data source was 
in-depth, semi structured interviews with key managers, engineers and other 
professionals involved in the innovation projects asking them to relate the triggers, 
motivations and development phases for the new products and practices. This was 
supplemented by archival data such as documentation, procedures, working papers 
and observation of operations.  
 
In all, data was collected from 123 interviews from all levels in the organisation.  
Interviews were of variable length but with a mean of approximately 1.5 hours.  
Where possible interviews were tape recorded and transcribed for analysis.  Where 
this was not possible or inappropriate, extensive field notes were made immediately 
after the interview.  These were also transcribed and validated by respondents in order 
to become part of the final data set.  
 
The researchers then coded the interviews and other data, building categories on the 
sources and triggers for the innovations, the subsequent stages of implementation, the 
practices employed at each stage and the factors enabling and inhibiting the 
innovation project. All individual project cases were then shared and compared with 
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those compiled by colleague researchers to ensure agreement over their 
interpretations. The final stage of validation was a series of workshops where the 
researchers presented the emerging results to practitioners and elicited any comments 
and corrections.   
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Exhibit 1: CONCEPTS 
 
SEARCH: In this article we use the term search as shorthand for ‘problemistic 
search’, that is organisational activity that is stimulated by a problem and 
directed toward its solution. Problemistic search is therefore oriented around a 
specific goal and is distinguished from random curiosity or general scanning in 
order to collect information or advance knowledge. A high profile example 
was the year-long re-engineering effort to correct the “wobbly” Millennium 
Bridge built over the River Thames in London. 
 
STANDARD ROUTINES: Standard routines are the repetitive practices and 
operating procedures that are employed within an organisation so that work is 
accomplished. In this article we are particularly interested in the routines 
directed towards search. Examples include the practice of hiring ‘head-
hunters’ when planning an executive succession, or performing known testing 
procedures to diagnose why a piece of production equipment is not working 
properly. Although standard search routines are repetitive and predictable, the 
outcome of the process may be quite new and unexpected. 
 
NON-ROUTINE PRACTICES: We use the term non routine for those 
practices that are employed to conduct search but are not frequently and 
regularly used in the organisation. They may be experimental and new to the 
organisation or even new to the world, but they may also be proven techniques 
and “kept in the back pocket” for occasional use. Innovative routines might 
include brainstorming techniques, strategic retreats or else improvised 
practices that are not planned or structured before they are performed.   
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Exhibit 3: 
Examples of innovation projects in the partner organisations 
 
Radical Product Innovations 
 
• Absorbent polystyrene meat tray 
 
• Simulation screen using Liquid Crystal Display technology  
 
• Service for dementia sufferers in under 65 age group 
 
• Microcomputer-based training solutions 
 
Incremental Product Innovations 
 
• Enhanced functionality upgrade to telephone exchanges 
 
• New whisky blend distilled in wine barrels for light, sweeter finish 
 
• Screen display distortion reducer 
 
• Multi-application software architecture 
 
Radical Organisational Process Innovations 
 
• Re-organisation from functional  to cross-functional teams 
 
• In-line reduction and filtration of whisky  
 
• Satellite positioning and messaging system for road maintenance vehicles 
 
• Introducing outsourcing of design 
 
Incremental Organisational Process Innovations 
 
• Projects ‘lessons-learned’ database  
 
• Introducing telephone sales for packaging 
 
• Training needs assessment procedure 
 
• Work breakdown structure 
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Exhibit 4: The Innovation barriers framework 
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Exhibit 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCONTINOUS INNOVATION PROJECT: CBT SOLUTIONS 
 
INNOVATION BARRIER: (Micro)Computer Based Training was lowering 
barriers to entry in the flight simulation industry. SimCo needed to move from 
being a provider of simulators which were large, high-cost pieces of equipment, to 
a position of providing solutions to training needs, involving whatever 
technologies were appropriate. This entailed building a capability in computer 
based training, including the subtleties of courseware design, assessment as well 
as the technicalities of software and hardware. 
 
ROUTINES DEPLOYED: Standard routines and non-routine practices were 
deployed.  Standard routines included the drafting of a working paper arguing the 
urgent need for rethinking product strategy, a series of presentations also were 
important in persuading and advocating the move into CBT. External routines 
included attending academic and commercial conferences and promoting the 
firm’s developing capability at them. These were all regular and mundane 
occurrences to the organisation. 
 
Non routine practices included the recruitment of specialist professionals that were 
unfamiliar to the firm, such as an educational psychologist, as well as the 
introduction of a training needs analysis routine to be undertaken with every new 
contract. A useful external search non-routine was participating in IEEE technical 
standards bodies relating to CBT development. 
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DISCONTINUOUS INNOVATION BARRIER: LCD SIMULATORS 
 
INNOVATION BARRIER: ScreenCo had never entered the fast jet training 
market since the current portfolio of technologies could not fulfil the demand. One 
prospective solution was Liquid Crystal Display technology, which always 
promised to simulate fast jets but was not quite ready. The level of detail was not 
adequate for a believable simulated environment. A change came as the US Air 
Force developed a prototype using a rival solution to LCD demonstrating the 
demand. An LCD based sphere would provide a superior experience but would be 
a much more complex product than conventional offerings, requiring a far greater 
number of projector channels than the industry had seen before. 
  
ROUTINES DEPLOYED: This break from a prior technological path was 
managed through a mix of standard procedure and unorthodox practices. The 
project was funded in response to a standard internal proposal, but this had been 
developed through a brainstorm in a hotel room and with schematic diagrams and 
specifications added on a transatlantic flight. The project was straightforward in its 
internal execution, accomplishing intermediate target routines along the way such 
as building a concept demonstrator which was exhibited at the big annual industry 
show. Outputs were standard, such as publications in industry magazines and 
some patents of the leading edge work. Yet a non-routine aspect to the project was 
a co-operative R&D agreement with an end user organisation which brought in 
human factors expertise to the developing product. 
Exhibit 6: FoodPack innovation project: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard Routines and ‘Non-Routines’ in the FoodPack innovation project 
 
 
Standard Routines 
 
 
Non-Routine Practices 
 
 
Product concept and prototype developed 
in Technical Centre then received by 
operating divisions 
 
 
Cross-functional team co-located in same 
space for three months to brain storm 
concept and work towards a prototype 
Dedicated product development 
engineers 
 
Operators, technicians, experts and sales 
personnel seconded from functions 
Well defined requirements and 
specification 
 
General ‘solution’ needed to problem of 
pad-less tray 
Resourcing specified by technical 
management 
 
Project team promised “anything they 
wanted” 
Formal Stage Gate process of 
development 
 
1 year deadline for completed product, 
with regular progress reviews with Board 
Full documentation on systems required  
 
Documentation as team desired- “writing 
on the walls” 
 
Equipment drawn from product 
development pool 
 
Equipment from active operations used 
for project 
INNOVATION BARRIER:  This persistent innovation barrier relates to the 
development of a polystyrene tray for meat, which could absorb the product’s 
blood and juices. Conventional meat trays needed an absorbent pad between the 
meat and the tray surface, which added a 30% cost to each unit produced. Also 
by removing the pad the shelf-life of meat products could be extended to 12-14 
days. Making an absorbent, pad-less tray had become a holy grail to the food 
packaging industry and in spite of some tests and promising techniques a 
technical solution had never been achieved.   
FOODPACK COMPANY BACKGROUND:  FoodPack is a multinational 
plastics producer that supplies packaging for food retailers including large 
supermarket chains and global brand fast food vendors. The firm generally is first-
to-market with innovations in the product categories in which it competes and 
actively tries to refresh product lines to sustain its advantage over competitors. 
The strategy is that 50% of revenues derive from products developed within the 
previous 5 years, with a step- change innovation every 2 years.  
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Exhibit 7: ScreenCo innovation project: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard Routines and ‘Non- Routines’ in the ScreenCo innovation project 
 
 
Standard Routines 
 
 
Non Routine Practices 
 
R&D team research and produce 
feasibility study of concept 
 
 
Cross-functional team meet to brainstorm 
nature of problem and solution.  
R&D team develop prototype and pass on 
to product teams 
 
Product team technical members develop 
prototype and final product 
Resourcing formally applied for in 
stages; decided and provided by R&D 
Director 
Resources ‘begged, borrowed and 
stolen’- team worked in over time; 
materials improvised  
 
Presentation of concept to potential 
customers 
 
Borrowed customer’s products for testing 
Prototype production allotted in the 
factory schedule 
 
Team produced prototype over weekend 
Full documentation Loose documentation at team’s own 
discretion  
 
Design reviews with standard checklists Occasional ‘Sanity checks’ with directors 
and engineers 
 
INNOVATION BARRIER: This persistent innovation barrier was an imperfection 
in one of the firm’s core products: a ‘panorama’ wraparound style screen. The 
projected image became distorted at the edge of the screen, which was tolerated for 
some years and although it had had some attention, was not a priority to correct. It 
became a more urgent problem when ScreenCo wanted to enter the pickier military 
market. Military flight training needed a clear image at the edge of the screen since 
this was where a pilot would visualise reloading artillery. The successful innovation 
was a technique called the ‘Distort Reducer’ which was later patented. It was 
developed through the non routine practices listed below
SCREENCO COMPANY BACKGROUND: ScreenCo is a supplier of high-end 
screen displays and structures for a wide range of visualisation applications. These 
include flight and military simulation training, corporate presentation and 
broadcasting, and a growing range of applications in virtual reality for engineering, 
education and entertainment. ScreenCo was created in 1984 and has been growing at 
a steady rate of around 20% for 10 years to170 employees. 
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Exhibit 8: 
 
MISMATCH OF ROUTINES WITH PERSISTENT BARRIER 
 
SimCo faced a persistent innovation barrier in the shape of core software architecture 
(CSA). Engineers had long argued for a central development environment which 
would form a core structure. Different applications could be developed around this 
core but it would avoid duplication of effort and reduce risks of individual projects. 
This had been discussed and some experimentation had been done, but the diversified 
nature of software projects in the firm had shown that this would need to be a major 
project. 
 
A champion of the CSA had got agreement from the company directors and project 
managers to develop it, but the wrong choice of organisational practice was made. 
Instead of taking the problem out of standard routine operations the innovation 
development was attached to a live contract so as to partly fund the work. This 
sounded like good financial sense at the time, but it had the effect of creating 
conflicting priorities. The project manager tried to mix non-routine practices and 
improvisation with the less-exotic demands of the contracted work tasks. The live 
project gradually dominated priorities while the CSA work floundered. The CSA 
eventually was successfully completed and is now being used as a firm-wide resource, 
but the project had gone £300K over its budget, 65% over the projection. 
 
The project manager concluded the CSA would have been better developed as a 
separate endeavour from a live contract “We shouldn’t have done a development of 
this nature on a live project, with project timescales and deadlines.” Persistent 
innovation barriers of this type tend to be undermined when competing with the 
clearer demands of everyday business. 
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